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The problem of this paper has many aspects. A sociologist might consider it as
a study of changing attitudes of large groups of people, varying in time and place.
A practical politician who thought of it in much the same way would certainly
describe it in different words. A school administrator might treat it as a study of
efficient pedagogy. The American lawyer, no matter whether he comes from a
northern or southern state,' is apt to consider it as a problem in federalism. He may
'*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1 "The South" is not an exact term. HAMY S. Assmom, in THE NEGRO AND TE ScHOOLs 13 note,
(1954), includes in it 13 states-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. All these states require
that Negroes and whites be educated separately. But so do (or did before the Supreme Court decisions
of May, 1954) Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia. So did the District of Columbia. And
in Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming, segregated schooling was optional, though there is
no record of its being practiced in Wyoming. The constitutional and statutory references covering all
these 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Alaska, are given below in this note.
In Florida, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee schooling whites and Negroes together is expressly
forbidden by statute even in private schools (FLA. STAT. ANN. §228.o9 (1953); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§z58.020 (i953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §5-5; TENN. CODE ANN. §11395 (Williams 1934)).
Some states make special provision for peoples other than Negroes and whites. Delaware directs
the establishment of schools for "children of people called Moors or Indians" (DEL. CODE ANN. tit 14,
§14I(c) (1953)). Mississippi and North Carolina make separate provision for Indians (Miss. CODE
ANN. §6632 (1942); N. C. CODE §X15-2 (1943)). In New York, Indian children on reservations
changed from separate schools to the general public school system in September, 1954. See N. Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1954, p. 1, col. 7.
In Mississippi, "white" means "Caucasian"; "colored" means all other races (Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U. S. 78 (1927)). In Oklahoma, "colored children" means children of African descent. "White
children" includes all others (OF.A. CoNsr. Art. XIII §W).
In Alaska, the legislature is empowered "to establish and maintain schools for white and colored
children and children of mixed blood who lead a civilized life in said Territory. ... (ALASCA CoM'.
LAws ANN. §37-s-s (949)), but this appears to be construed not to provide for segregated schools (Jones
v. Ellis, 8 Alaska 146, 147 (r929)).
CONSTITTrIONAL AND STATUTORY REFERENCES
Segregation Mandatory
Alabama: ALABA.At CONsr. Art. XV, §256.
ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§93, x67 (1940).
Arkansas: ARx STAT. ANNO. §8o-509 (1947).
Delaware: DEL. CONSr. Art. io, §2.
DEt.. CODE ANN. it. 14, §r41 (1953).
District of Columbia: D. C. CODE ANN. §§31-1I1o, 31-1111, 31-1113, 31-1OII (1951).
Florida: FLA. CoNsr. Art. 12, §12.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §228.09 (I953).
Georgia: GA. CONsr. Art. VIII, §2-6401.
GA. CODE ANN. §§32-9o9, 32-937 (1952).
Kentuc y: Ky. CONST. §187.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§158.o2o, T58.oa, 158.025 (953).
Louisiana: LA. CONsr. Art. XII, §x.
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ask how far the government of the United States will undertake to oblige the inhabi-
tants of a minority of the states of the union to comply with what the constitutional
organs of that government declare to be proper in public education, and what prac-
tical means of enforcement and resistance the legal mechanisms of the nation and
states provide.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States, deciding the sub-
stantive issues in five notable cases,2 indicated that hereafter the Federal Government
would require of all public schools compliance with a new standard of equal treat-
ment of pupils, regardless of race, a standard under which separate education of
Negroes and whites is proscribed. This paper will treat of that decision, and some
of its possible effects.
A surprise awaiting one who first begins the study of racial segregation in public
schools is the legal persistence of the practice in some Northern areas until com-
paratively recent times. Charles Sumner's eloquent but unsuccessful argument made
a little over a century ago on behalf of Sarah Roberts, a Negro child, in her attempt
to gain admission to a Boston school for white children, is an early landmark.8
The segregation upheld in that case was eliminated by a Massachusetts statute in
1855, but today's Northerner is apt to learn with some amazement that the New
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 77, §§124, 207 (195!).
Mississippi: Mss CoNsr. Art. 8, §207.
Miss. CODE ANN. §§6276, 6632, 6633 (1942).
Missouri: Mo. CONST. Art. XI, §i(a).
Mo. REV. S-AT. §163.130 (1949).
North Carolina: N. C. CONsT. Art. 9, §2.
N. C. CODE §115-2 (943).
Oklahoma: OKLA. CONsr. Art. I, §5, Art. XIII, §3.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§5-r, 5-5 (951).
Okla. Laws of 1949, p. 6o8, §i.
South Carolina: S. C. CONsr. Art. 11, §7.
S. C. CODE §21-751 (1952).
Tennessee: TENN. CONsT. Art. Ii, §12.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§2377, 2393.9 (Williams 1934).
Texas: TEx. CONST. Art. 7, §7.
TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. Art. 2900 (1948).
Virginia: VA. CoNsT. Art. 9, §140.
VA. CODE §29-221 (950).
West Virginia: W. VA. CONsr. Art. 12, §8.
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§1775, 1894 (z949).
Segregation Optional
Arizona: Amz. CODE ANN. §54-416 (Supp. 1952).
Kansas: KAN. GEN. STAT. §§21-2424, 72-1724 (1949).
New Mexico: N. M. STAT. ANN. §55-12o0 (194!).
Wyoming: WYo. CONsT. Art. 7, §1o.
Wyo. Co Mp. STAT. ANN. §67-624 (1945).
a Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas; Briggs v. Elliott; Davis v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia; Gebhart v. Belton; reported in 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
arose respectively in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. All except the Delaware case
originated in federal courts. In the Delaware case alone the plaintiff Negroes had prevailed in the
lower court.
The District of Columbia case is Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (19.54).
'Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849); rule reversed by Mass. Acts 1855, C. 256.
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York Court of Appeals upheld segregation in the Brooklyn public schools in i9oo,
and the Indiana Supreme Court reached the same result concerning Indianapolis
schools in I926.4 Less than three months after the decision of the New York case,
its rule was reversed by a statute which provided'
No person shall be refused admission into or be excluded from any public school in the
state of New York on account of race or color.
New York has gone farther than this prescription for public schools: it has im-
posed its statutory policy against discrimination by race on at least some private
schools.' The statutes of a few other states contain somewhat similar provisions.7
The states of the nation could be divided into four classes, according to their
treatment of Negroes or other racial groups in education. In 17 states and in the
District of Columbia, prior to the seventeenth of May, i954, segregation of Negro
students from others in publicly maintained schools was mandatory by constitution
or by statute. In 4 other states segregation was optional though not required. In
the remaining 27 states, segregation in the public schools is prohibited, or there is no
legislation on the subject. In a few of these states, segregation by race even in pri-
vate institutions is prohibited." In this federal republic of 48 states, then, the organic
law of the whole is in process of enforcement against the inconsistent law of 21, and
against whatever inconsistent federal statutes may apply to a federal area. The very
bulk of the dissenting states makes this a particularly troublesome problem of nation-
state relations.
II
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of schools. Its general clauses
which might bear on segregated state schooling are three: that which forbids the
state to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; that which forbids a state to deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law; and that which forbids a state to deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The phrase
'People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161 N.Y. 598, 56 N.E. 8z (i9oo). And see Greathouse v.
Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis, 198 Ind. 95, 151 N.E. 41I (1926); result reversed by
IND. ANN. STAT. §28-5x6o (1953 Cum. Supp.). In Hillsboro, Ohio, parents of Negro children sought
an injunction against racial segregation in public schools, in September 1954. See N.Y. Times, Sept.
30, X954, p. 32, col. 4.
'N.Y. Laws of 1900, c. 492.
'N.Y. CIVIL RIorrs LAw, §40. The institutions covered include". . . public libraries, kindergartens,
primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities, extension courses,
and all educational institutions under the supervision of the regents of the state of New York; and any
such public library, kindergarten, primary and secondary school, academy, college, university, professional
school, extension course, or other educational facility, supported in whole or in part by public funds or
by contributions solicited from the general public. See McKaine v. Drake Business School, o7
Misc. 241, 176 N.Y. Supp. 33 (Sup. Ct. i9g).
"New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §O:1-5 (I939).
Pennsylvania: PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4654 (i945).
Washington: WAsH. Rav. CODE §9.91.0io (1953).
Masachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws c. 272, §92A (1953 Cum. Supp.).
'See the summary and tabulation in notes i and 7, supra.
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"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" was so narrowly con-
strued in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases9 that it lost any meaning helpful in the
school question. There remain therefore of the Fourteenth Amendment clauses only
the two concerning due process and equal protection. Efforts to end segregation in
the public schools of the states have turned on the equal protection clause which
appears much more immediately relevant and less vague than "due process of law."
The history of segregation in public or publicly controlled institutions since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has had three phases. In 1896 came a de-
termination that equal protection was given by giving equal facilities, even if these
facilities were prescribed separately for different racial groups0 Relatively recently
came multiple litigation in which the states, availing themselves of the privilege to
furnish separate but equal facilities, found the equality in fact of these facilities sub-
ject to determination by the federal courts n The third stage began with the de-
cisions of May 17, 1954, which held segregation in public schools a denial of the
equal protection of the laws by states, without regard to equality in the separate
facilities; and found segregation a denial of due process by the United States in the
District of Columbia. This third stage will apparently continue as long as the
federal courts are called on to decide whether the allotment of pupils to public
schools is in fact made for reasons other than race.
"Equal but separate" had its Supreme Court origin in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson
(supra note io) although there had been antecedent decisions in state courts, and fed-
eral legislation in the District of Columbia had indicated that the Congress (if it
thought of the matter) did not deem separate schools for Negroes inconsistent with
any constitutional provision. Plessy's case arose out of an intrastate railroad journey in
Louisiana. Plessy, one-eighth Negro, was convicted in a Louisiana state court for
the statutory offense of riding in a coach reserved for whites. When he brought
his case to the Supreme Court of the United States, that Court held that so long as
Louisiana by statute required that facilities afforded Negroes be equal to those pro-
vided for whites, compulsory separation was no violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
inent. The Court's opinion was not unanimous. Associate Justice Harlan, dissenting,
spoke not only of the Fourteenth Amendment but of the Thirteenth, reasoning that
when the Constitution was amended to forbid slavery, the amenders intended to
eliminate all that went with slavery, and that legal segregation of the one-time slave
race was a relic of its servile status.12
9 z6 Wall. 36 (U.S. i8_73).
'oPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (x896).
SCorbin v. County School Board, Pulaski County, Va., 177 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. x949); Carter v.
School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F.2d 531 ( 4 th Cir. 195o); Brown v. Ramsay, 185 F.2d 225(8th Cir. 195o) (Ark.); Winborne v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. x952) (N.C.); McSwain v. County
Board of Education, 104 F. Supp. 86z (E.D. Tenn. x952); Wichita Falls Junior College District v. Battle,
204 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1953) (Tex.). See Robert A. Leflar and Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the
Public Schools-953 , 67 HAxv. L. REv. 377, 392 et seq. (i954) for other examples.
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In his opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 843
(1954), Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated that the doctrine of "separate but equal," enunciated in Plessy,
had since then come before the Supreme Court in only six education cases. The first of these was Cum-
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In 1927 the Supreme Court applied the principle of "equal but separate" to
public schools.' The Mississippi Constitution of i89o provided in Section 207:
Separate schools shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races.
Martha Lum, a nine-year old child of Chinese descent, born in the United States,
was excluded from a Mississippi school for white children on the ground that she
was not a member of the white race. Her father Gong Lum, and a "next friend"
obtained a mandamus order in a lower Mississippi court to compel the school authori-
ties to admit Martha to the white school. But the Supreme Court of Mississippi re-
versed this decision, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Mississippi, citing Roberts v. Boston (supra note 3), Plessy v. Ferguson, and the
statutes passed by the Congress concerning segregated schools in the District of
Columbia.
During the next seventeen years the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts;
accepting "equal but separate," were required in a number of cases to decide whether
or not equality actually existed in public educational facilities. The cases which
reached the Supreme Court all involved university study. That equality in fact
was a condition of permissible separateness appeared in 1938, when Missouri failed
in an effort to demonstrate equal treatment of Negro law students by offering them
tuition scholarships to study in other states. 4 The state maintained a school of law,
to which only white students were admitted. One Lloyd Gaines, unsuccessful in
obtaining a writ of mandamus from the Missouri state courts against the officers,
regents, Registrar, and Curators of the University of Missouri to compel his ad-
mission to the white law school, obtained a reversal in the Supreme Court of the
United States. That Court thus eliminated the possibility that any state could
escape the expense of maintaining duplicate facilities for Negroes by offering, to the
occasional Negro candidate who might wish to accept, tuition at out-of-state insti-
tutions.
In 1950 the Supreme Court decided two more significant cases concerning higher
education. One of these, involving the comparative merits of Negro and white law
ming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), in which colored citizens of Georgia failed in
an action to enjoin the Board of Education of Richmond County from maintaining a high school for
white children without also maintaining one for colored pupils. The opinion was written for a unanimous
court by Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in Plessy. He pointed out that the relief asked was an
injunction that would have either impaired the efficiency of the white high school or compelled its
closing, thus taking away education from white without giving it to colored children; and that if in some
appropriate proceeding for the purpose, the plaintiffs had sought to compel the Board of Education to
establish a high school for colored children, and if it appeared that the Board's refusal to maintain such
a school was an abuse of discretion, different questions might have arisen. Mr. Justice Harlan seems
to suggest that Cumming goes off on the wrong choice of remedy, and that "equal but separate" is only
remotely involved. The second and third of the six cases, were Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (927)
and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), discussed at page 173 of this article.
In the fourth case, Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (948), a Negro applicant was
granted a writ of mandamus for admission to the University of Oklahoma School of Law, which had been
limited to white students; the fifth and sixth were Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (950), both of which are discussed at page 174 of this article.
"Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
"Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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schools in Texas, made it clear that actual equality of academic facilities of every sort
was necessary to satisfy the requirement of equal protection." On the same day the
Court held that the University of Oklahoma denied equal protection of the laws
of that state to a Negro graduate student named McLaurin by requiring him to
occupy a specified classroom seat in a row reserved for colored students, a separate
table for colored students in the library, and a separate table in the cafeteria.' Even
though he thus attended the same instruction, had access to the same books, and
ate the same food as the white students, the Supreme Court said he was denied
equal protection. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson wrote of the restrictions which the
Court found invalid (339 U.S. at 641):
* ' ' they signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional
and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other students. The result is that
appellant is handicapped in'his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions
impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.
By the end of i95o, the Supreme Court had thus made it clear that if segregated
schooling was to be tolerated at all, the equality in question could not be merely
nominal. In the meantime, in various cases in lower federal courts, judges were
examining the comparative facilities in grade and high schools available to Negroes
and whites, and were enforcing substantial equivalence by injunctive process.' In
such opinions one finds judges weighing comparative "Carnegie Units,"'" profes-
sional certificates held by teachers, accreditation by the "Southern Association," char-
acter of school buses, length of school bus journeys, breadth of curriculum, athletic
and other physical education facilities, auditorium space available, summer school
facilities, extra-curricular activities, and similar features. "Equal but separate"
obliged the federal judges not only to compare the relative sufficiency of school
facilities, but to scrutinize the diligence of local school boards in correcting in-
equalities where these existed. If the local school authorities were, in the opinion of
the federal courts, making reasonable efforts to correct inequalities, Negro plaintiffs
were denied mandatory admission to white schools.
Before the seventeenth of May, 1954, then, the Supreme Court continued to restate
the theory that states might constitutionally afford equal but separate educational
facilities for Negro and white students; but the application of this principle to state
universities was such as to make furnishing equal facilities practically impossible; and
on the grade and high school level, federal district courts and courts of appeal were
strict in applying the requirement of substantial equality, though recognizing that
complete and exact equality was a practical impossibility and exhibiting some toler-
ance of the inevitable delays in what seems to have been a major program in the
"' Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (950).8 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
"A selection of such cases is given in note ii, supra. An admirable analysis is found in Robert
H. Leflar and Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 Htdv. L. REv. 377 (1954).
'a "Carnegie Units" is a term describing standards of measurement of the offerings in secondary
schools.
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South to stave off desegregation by achieving actual separate equality in Negro
schools.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, in its two short and unanimous opinions,
9
abolished the doctrine of "equal but separate" public education. The first of these
opinions announced the unconstitutionality of segregated schools in Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. The second found school segregation similarly
unconstitutional in the District of Columbia. In all five cases the Court held that
segregation according to race in public schools was a violation of constitutional pro-
hibitions-of the Fourteenth Amendment in the state cases and of the Fifth as regards
the District of Columbia.
The opinion in the four state cases, after giving the facts, disclaimed any idea
that by a sufficiently close study of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment a court could find some instruction, sufficiently clear
for reliance, as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment permitted or forbade segre-
gated public education. Chief Justice Warren's opinion was frank about the incon-
clusive nature of this historical study. He said (347 U.S. at 489):
This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources gave
some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best,
they are inconclusive.
This inconclusive character was accentuated by the rudimentary nature of public
education in some parts of the United States in 1868. The Court pointed out that
in the South the movement toward free common schools supported by general
taxation had then gained little headway. Even in the North ungraded schools were
common in rural areas, and compulsory attendance, the Court said, was virtually
unknown. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that the various
groups drafting and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did not dearly have
before them the problems facing the contemporary United States, in which com-
pulsory schooling is everywhere accepted as normal, and in which increasingly elab-
orate school establishments acutely point up any favoritism in their administration.
In the previous equal but separate education cases before the Court, the unani-
mous opinion argues, it was unnecessary to consider overturning Plessy v. Ferguson;
either the issue was not properly raised, or inequality in the schools was evident,
and thus the Court was not faced with a case where mere segregation, without
tangible inequality, was under consideration. Reconciliation of later with prior
decisions in order to preserve the decorum of judicial continuity is an accepted and
useful convention. No good purpose is here served by speculating on the soundness
of this statement that McLaurin of i95o was a case substantially different from the
five grade school cases of May, 1954. At any rate the Court found that, in the four
cases then decided, the Negro and white schools below had been equalized, or were
"being equalized" with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications, salaries of
"o Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, and other cases, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). See note 2, supra.
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teachers, and other tangible factors. In these cases, then, the Court was faced with
a decision as to the effect on public education of segregation by itself.
The opinion in the four state cases rejects the verbal symmetry of the argument
that if equal tangible facilities be available alike for the Negro child and the white
child, the state is granting equal protection though the two be kept separate, and thus
the Negro is no more prejudiced than the white. To say that the state awakens in the
white child who is forbidden to go to a Negro school the same feelings that it gen-
erates in the Negro who is forbidden to go to the white school, is to disregard the
entire history of negro slavery and its consequences since 1865. The Court recog-
nizes this difference in the effect on Negro children (347 U.S. at 494-495):
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on
their education opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court
which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benfits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy
v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal"
has no place....
It is always a little surprising to remind one's self that the Constitution contains
no express requirement that the Federal Government give its people equal protection.
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary in the four state cases to consider whether
segregation violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but in
the District of Columbia case, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was
the only provision available. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by
divided vote, had declined to enjoin segregation in the district in i95o20 and the
lower federal courts ruled similarly in Bolling v. Sharpe. But the Supreme Court,
reversing the decision below, declared segregated schooling a denial by the United
States of due process of law. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the unanimous
Court, laid a broad philosophic foundation for the decision. He stated a concept
of government limited to action for reasonable ends (347 U.S. at 499-500):
Although the Court has not assumed, to define "liberty" with any great precision, that
term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends
to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be re-
stricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is
o Carr v. Corning, Superintendent of Public Schools, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 595o).
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not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro
children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
their liberty in violation of the the Due Process Clause.
0
These are words in a great tradition, a tradition sometimes forgotten or doubted
in a time when we must constantly turn to government for innumerable services
and prohibitions. They are a reminder that despite the constricting of individual man
by the crowd, escape from harassment remains a great good; they give off an echo
of Locke, choosing, significantly, to write "Of the Extent of the Legislative Power,"
and telling us2l
*.. that even absolute Power, where it is necessary,... is still limited by that Reason, and
confined to those Ends, which required it....
At the end of its opinions the Court, expanding the conventional "settle decree on
notice," directed in all five cases reargument of two questions at the October, 1954
term. The Court first asks for light as to whether within "normal geographic school
districting" Negro children must forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice;
or, on the other hand, whether the Supreme Court of the United States, in the exer-
cise of its equity powers, might permit effective gradual adjustment from segregated
systems to a system not based on color distinctions. Assuming that such a gradual
adjustment is decided upon, the Court in the second place asks whether it should
formulate the decrees and, if so, what they should contain: whether the Court should
appoint a Master to take evidence on the terms of the decree; or whether the Court
should remand the cases to the courts of first instance for decrees to be formulated
there.
As this paper is written, in October, 1954, the result of the required reargument
is necessarily a matter of speculation. One might hazard the suggestion that settle-
ment of the terms of final decrees is work for trial courts; that gradual desegregation
is constitutionally permissible if there be some educational or administrative reason
for it aside from racial prejudice alone; that delay solely to allow 'reluctant
parents to grow used to the approaching inevitable is forbidden by the Constitution.
But this remains to be seen.
III
The effect of the segregation cases on the people of the United States, like the
effect of all new law, whether made by legislatures or by judges, is not easy to pre-
dict. One can speculate about the profound influence on a whole new generation
of equal association in the classroom and, wondering about a new era in social
relations, reflect that, even in states where such classrooms have long been common,
traces of race troubles can still be seen. A more immediate inquiry concerns the
legal effectiveness of the Supreme Court's judgment in the states where it runs
counter to present practice. The 21 affected states and the District of Columbia
2
' JOHN LocxK, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Boor II, AN EssAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, ExTENT
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT C. XI, Of the Extent of the Legislative Power, par. x39, p. 188 (Every-
man's Lib., Rhys ed. 1924).
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present a moving picture, confused by the rapid change of scenes. There is a suc-
cession of state commissions, legislative proposals, constitutional amendments, head-
lines, feature articles, and gubernatorial pronouncements which sometimes seem
related to the fact that public schools and political campaigns open at about the same
time. For the moment the whole subject seems more journalism than constitution-
alism, fluid as law, but notably conspicuous as a contemporary problem.
In the District of Columbia and in 7 states, integration of schools appears to have
been accepted as a decided matter,2" and as classes open in the fall of 1954 the
authorities, with somewhat varying alacrity, are proceeding to make it effective.
The movement to carry out the Supreme Court's judgment in good heart was greatly
advanced by President Eisenhower when, on the day after the decisions were handed
down, he told the Commissioners of the District of Columbia that he hoped the
national capital would be a model for other areas that had changeover problems
because of the Supreme Court's ruling, and asked the Commissioners for regular
reports on their progress in ending school segregation. 3 Hobart M. Coming, Super-
intendent of Schools, immediately began arrangements for the change, to begin in
the fall of 1954 and to be substantially completed by the fall of 1955. The plan was
adopted by the Board of Education despite the contrary vote of two Negro members
who, understandably enough, urged that the changeover be handled at once.24 But
the plan was, on the other hand, too rapid to suit a group called the Federation of
i'itizens'Associations, which in September attempted to enjoin effective desegrega-
tion-in the District of Columbia until the Supreme Court should have decreed a
"'master plan' for the Nation." Federal District Judge Schweinhaut on September 9
denied the injunction, after hearing argument from the Assistant Corporation Coun-
sel of' the District who pointed out that desegregation was already far advanced,
great expense had been incurred in the process, and that reversal at this point would
be costly and chaotic for the schools of the District.2
The most notable feature of the commencement of desegregation was its gen-
erally calm reception. A somewhat unusual preacher in Hobbs, New Mexico, de-
claring that God had segregated the three children of Noah, organized a Segrega-
tion Committee to protest the change, but the schools in Hobbs quietly opened with
mixed attendance despite his biblical warning.28 In Philippi, West Virginia, two
hundred angry white parents crowded the School Board's meeting room to protest
the assignment of a white teacher and a dozen white students to what had been an
all-Negro school, and members of nine white families announced that they would
not send their children to such an establishment. 27
"N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1954, §4, P. 2E, cOl. 3. Full compliance was reported in the optional states of
Arizona, New Mexico, and Kansas. There were no segregated schools in the fourth optional state,
Wyoming. Four border states-West Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware-as well as the
District of Columbia, had begun integration in at least some of their schools.
" N.Y. Times, May 19, 1954, P. I, col. 4. "N.Y. Times, June 3, 1954 p. 25, col. 4.
-"N.Y. Times, Sept. zo, 1954, p. I, col. 5. "N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1954, P. 1, col. 3.
27 N.Y. Times, Aug. i9, 1954, p. 21, col. 2. A "strike" of pupils in another West Virginia high
school at White Sulphur Springs was reported on Sept. r3, 1954. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1954, p.
23, cols. 3 and 4.
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In the community known as "Four States" in Marion County, West Virginia,
a state court injunction was used to end the "rebellion" of 53 parents who as a pro-
test kept their children out of an integrated school2 71
Integration in Delaware began calmly, and except in a few communities con-
tinued uneventfully. In the small city of Milford, however, due apparently to the
efforts of one Bryant W. Bowles, leader of the "National Association for the Advance-
ment of White People," there occurred some disorder and picketing of a formerly
white high school to which ten Negroes had been admitted. The School Board
resigned, and the successor board resolved the crisis by sending the ten Negroes to a
school some 17 miles away.27b On October 14, i95i, Vice Chancellor Marvel of
the Delaware Chancery Court, on the application of the parents of the ten excluded
children, held that the children were entitled to injunctive relief readmitting them
to the Milford school.270 The school board served a notice of appeal, and the en-
forcement of the decree was stayed by the state Supreme Court until the middle of
December 7d It was notable that in Wilmington, the largest city of Delaware, and
in the small town of Dover, only twenty miles from Milford, desegregation occurred
without disorder or complication.
Unruly protests similar to those which had appeared in Delaware made brief
appearances in Baltimore and Washington. Baltimore Police Commissioner Ober
declared that he would enforce regulations making it illegal to persuade children
to stay out of school; in Washington, Superintendent of Schools Corning warned
"strikers" that they would disqualify themselves for all school privileges and be
denied extra-curricular activities. The disturbances in Baltimore and and Wash-
ington i imediately came to an end. 7' The most striking feature of such episodes in
the press was their comparative rarity.
In North Carolina, an Associated Press survey on September 4, 1954 reported that
no Negroes had applied for admission to white schools.28 With 8 other states, North
Carolina appeared to be taking a wait-and-see attitude, delaying action until the
Supreme Court should have taken further steps 9 Four states in the deep South-
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina-were making such moves as
seemed possible to avoid the expected decree by legal strategem ° Even in this re-
gion, where for various reasons the strongest resistance might be expected, there
was little talk of forcible opposition. The legal maneuvers reflected the perennial
:
7IN.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1954, P. 32, col. 2.
~b Id., col. I.
270 N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1954, p- x, col. 6.
aT'Simmons v. Steiner, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2188. See for a review of the Milford case, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1954, §e, p. 4, col. s.
T' See Time, Oct. x8, 1954, p. 5o; id., Oct. 25, 1954, p- 43. A continuing survey of the effect of
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of May 17, x954, is being made by the Southern
School News published by the Southern Educational Reporting Service, Nashville, Tennessee.
28 N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1954, P. 36, cols. z and 2.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, X954, §4, P. 2E, col. 3. The nine "wait and see" states were: Arkansas,
Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
"
0 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1954, §4, P. 2E, col. 4.
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and generally vain hope of those to whom some law is displeasing that by a change
in verbal formulas they can escape the law's substance.
The requirement that a state give equal protection to its people can be ineffectual
under two sets of circumstances. In the first place, a state obviously can classify its
people in many ways without violating the requirement of equal protection; state
laws treat children differently from adults, protect women more than men, benefit
veterans as a group, tax rich more than poor, promote pupils who pass examinations
and hold back those who fail-examples of such permissible differentiation are
endless. The equal protection clause means, in plain terms, that equal protection
must be given unless there is some legitimate reason for difference. The Supreme
Court has made clear that race is not such a legitimate reason, but if some other
pretext for classification can be discovered which incidentally classifies Negroes, the
Supreme Court is sometimes thought to be precluded from noticing the stratagem,
and to be obliged to accept the classification at its face value.
The other escape from the requirement of equal protection is in avoidance of
state action. The Fourteenth Amendment is a command to states; in the absence
of some such state legislation as the New York Civil Rights Law, a non-governmental
group can succeed in discriminating on racial grounds as it sees fit. These two
devices-classification on apparently non-racial grounds, and disestablishment of the
activity in question so that it appears wholly private-include all the varieties of
legal stratagems suggested for escape from the Supreme Court's decision. The flaws
in plans based on either of them-which will, I think, ultimately bring them to
nothing-are the unwillingness of the Court to be duped by unconvincing appear-
ances, and the unwillingness of the people in any state to give up public education.
Race is a subject on which the Court has shown itself sensitive. Judges are willing
to see through pretext to substance much more readily where the question is race
than when it is, say, local police regulation dressed as federal taxation.31
One device, much discussed, is the gerrymander. Classification by residential
location is a perfectly acceptable means of allotting children to schools, and where
many Negro children live in one neighborhood there are bound to be many Negro
children in the nearest school, regardless of the state concerned. A school district
can be laid out with this in mind, and so achieve a certain amount of racial classi-
fication. But the Supreme Court has made clear the constitutional impossibility of
legal restriction of any race to a specified neighborhood,"2 and sooner or later this
will defeat even an ingenious plan of racial districting. People will move to get for
their children the schooling they desire. Furthermore gerrymandering which pro-
3 Compare Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (i9s5) in which a "grandfather clause" which had
the effect of excluding Negroes from the franchise though not so stated in terms was held invalid, with
the case of United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (953) in which the Supreme Court upheld a
federal excise tax on the business of accepting wagers, despite somewhat persuasive arguments that the
Congress had made a specious use of the power to tax in order to penalize gambling, an activity prop-
erly within the sole cognizance of the several states.
"
2 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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gresses to the point of clear defiance of the Supreme Court's judgment is in danger
of defeat as a transparent pretext.
Louisiana, during the summer of 1954, pressed the theory of permissible classifica-
tion to a remarkable point by adopting a statute and proposing a state constitutional
amendment, both of which undertook to separate white and colored children in
public elementary and secondary schools3'
... in the exercise of the State police power to promote and protect public health, morals,
better education and the peace and good order in the state and not because of race.
This appears to be a legislative declaration that the expected difficulties of mixed
schools make racial segregation necessary after all!
Not all refusals to delay the end of segregation can be condemned as disingenuous.
During a transition period there may well be legitimate educational reasons for
gradual desegregation-for the temporary continuation of some Negroes in separate
schools. The reason for this arises from sins of the past. In some places the schools
for Negroes, one confesses with distress, have been decidedly below the educational
standard of white schools. A conscientious school administrator, earnestly devoted
to the policy of the Supreme Court's decision and eager to give it full force at the
earliest possible moment, may still see that to put some, say, high school sophomores
whose preparation is deficient into a class substantially beyond their educational
grade is neither kind nor educationally sound. But here again, while classification
for genuine educational reasons is permissible, it may not be used as a pretext to
continue segregated schools after difference in standards of learning has been ad-
justed. As the federal courts were able to judge of the equivalence in fact of Negro
and white schools when the rule was equal but separate, so they will be able to
decide when genuinely educational reasons have ceased to justify continued separate-
ness.?
4
The device of eliminating state action, making all the one-time public schools
private and therefore beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, has progressed
in South Carolina to approval by the voters, in November 1952, of a state consti-
tutional amendment, authorizing the legislature to discontinue public schools.3 5
Mississippi is submitting a similar amendment to the voters on December 21, I954.? "
Governor Talmadge of Georgia has sponsored a state constitutional amendment to
3 La. Acts 1954, Nos. 555 and 752. The constitutional amendment was approved by the voters
in November X954. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1954, P. 31, col. I.
' One suggestion, which seems never to have reached the point of legislation, is the proposal that
compulsory desegregation be opposed by the partial means of dividing the schools in the objecting states
into schools for boys and schools for girls, thereby eliminating one feature of mixed education which
has from time to time evoked criticism. This plan would not, however, achieve the end of preventing
all racial association in social equality.
"Acts and Joint Resolutions, South Carolina, 1952, No. 902, p. 2223, proposing the repeal of the
free public school requirement of SouTH CAROLINA CoNsmrrtrrnoN, Art. XI, §5. This amendment under
Art. XVI, §i, to be effective required further action of the General Assembly. It was so ratified on
March ig, 1954.
35A See Southern School News, Oct. 1954, p. 9; N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1954, p. 35, col. 3; id., Sept.
10, 1954, P. 2i, col. .
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be voted on in November 1954,3" authorizing the General Assembly to "provide
for grants of state, county or municipal funds to citizens of the state for educa-
tional purposes, in discharge of all obligation of the state to provide adequate educa-
tion for it[s] citizens. 37  In no one of these three states is the amendment self-
executing. The state legislatures are authorized but not required to disestablish
their public schools.
One may, to be sure, expect more private schools in the South as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision. Wherever the public schools are unsatisfactory to any
substantil part of the population for any reason-religious, educational, or other-
non-governmental schools have an increased patronage. Furthermore, some public
aid to or regulation of a private organization is compatible with sufficient privateness
to escape the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. New York gave land and en-
trusted the power of eminent domain to Stuyvesant Town Corporation, but its
conduct did not seem to a majority of the New York Court of Appeals to amount
to state action?' Religious schools are accepted as satisfying the New York require-
ment of compulsory attendance only if their instruction is at least substantially
equal to that given in the public schools,"9 but they escape the effect of the McCollum
decision40 by reason of their nongovernmental character. The small degree of
governmental influence on parochial schools arising out of this requirement of the
New York Education Law is not sufficient to make their conduct "state action."
The State of New York at a substantial cost fitted a building for classroom use at
Canisius College in Buffalo during the great demand for college instruction after the
end of the war in 1945,41 but one does not suppose that that Jesuit institution thereby
became subject to the federal constitutional restriction that the Supreme Court applied
to the public schools of Champaign, Illinois.
It is theoretically possible, then, for a state which feels strongly enough about
the Supreme Court's desegregation decision to abandon public education entirely,
so escaping the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment, while still giving some support
to private schools or to school children. A state might convey all its school prop-
erties to non-governmental corporations, or to individuals, might repeal its com-
pulsory education laws, and merely offer money scholarships to any child, Negro
or white, who chose to attend school. But the difficulties are great.' In the first
3" N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1954, P. 36, col. 6. This amendment was approved by the voters. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 4, 1954, p. 3, col. '.
" See House Resolution No. 225, Resolution Act No. x56, approved by Governor Talmadge, Dec. xx,
1953; see also N.Y. Times, Sept 14, 1954, p. 23, col x.
" Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 54i (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
98r (195o).
"' N.Y. EDUC. LAw §3204.
"Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Supreme Court in
this case held that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the state of Illinois when it permitted
religious instruction in a public school classroom, thereby putting some constraint on a dissenter to avail
himself of an excuse to leave the room.
"See Bull v. Stichman, 189 Misc. 587, 72 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct 1947), afl'd, 273 App. Div. 311,
78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1948), afl'd, 298 N.Y. 516, So N.E.2d 661 (1948).
42 See Lenoir and Lenoir, Compulsory Legal Segregation in the Public Schools, with Special Relerence
to Georgia, 5 MERcER L. REV. 211 (1954); Nicholson, The Legal Standing of the South's School Re-
sistance Proposals, 7 S.C.L.Q. 1 (x954).
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place, the modern South is progressive, growing in wealth, proud of its culture and
its high civilization, peopled with kindly and educated Americans. Faced with the
prospect of abandoning public education, even when this is proposed because of emo-
tions and customs rooted deep in the past, the people of any southern state will
hesitate, and I think, refuse. For the public school, too, is rooted deep in our emo-
tions and our customs. The one-room schoolhouse of our fathers, and the acres-wide
consolidated high of our sons, both have been our pride too long to give up. We
have heard from too many graduation day platforms that in our country learning is
free to everybody, and that the first charge on our means is the support of public
education, to be willing to turn away from all this because of what the Supreme
Court has told us.
The same pride will, I think, keep any significant numbers of us from trying by
elaborate pretense to conceal actual publicness in our schools. Clandestine public
education is out of character; the people of no state seem likely to welcome it. Nor
would it avail. The device has been tried in the closely related business of elections.
When in Texas the members of the Jaybird Association contended that they were
purely a private political group having no connection with the state and so entitled
on racial or any other grounds to exclude any people they pleased from their polls,
the Supreme Court overrode them. 3
State laws and semi-public controls prejudicial to the Negro race have little
viability in the courts. No matter how syllogistically perfect the reasoning by which
the policy of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is avoided, the
strong policy remains. "Equal but separate" was an ingenious device that worked
for fifty-eight years, but the fundamental reason for its final breakdown was stated
in Harlan's dissent in the Plessy case: 44
I am of opinion that the statute ... is inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens,
white and black ... and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the
United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several States of the
Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery as an institution
tolerated by law would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but there would
remain a power in the States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment
of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the
basis of race; and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American
citizens, now constituting a part of the political community called the -People of the
United States, for whom, and by whom through representatives, our government is ad-
ministered.
He could have been writing of some school laws.
There will be delays and devices for a while, man being what he is. But by and
by it will be self-evident that, so far as concerns their schoolhouses, all children are
created equal.
"Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (953).
1 163 U.S. 537 at 563-564 (1896).
